DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER

The US Supreme court observed that District of Columbia’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense and in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.

In 5-4 judgment delivered on June 26, 2008 by US Supreme Court ruled that

1. The Second Amendment to US Constitution protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. It was significant to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved.

(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment to the US Constitution.

(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.

(e) United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes.

2. The Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example - prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings; laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms; etc.

Thus Second Amendment to US Constitution protects an individual's right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined.

Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.

In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001

In this case appeal was sought from orders dated January 10, 2006 entered in district court for the Southern District of New York (Casy J.), which dismissed claims against certain Saudi Arabian defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs/ appellants were persons who incurred losses in September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks: those who suffered personal injuries, the families and representatives of those who died, insurers and property owners. They brought tort claims against number of parties: foreign governments, charitable entities, and individuals alleged to have provided financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda in the runup to the attacks. Appellants preferred appeal in respect of seven of the dismissed defendants: the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, four Saudi Princess, a Saudi Banker, and the Saudi High Commission.

The chief issue in appeal was the scope of foreign sovereign immunity. The court observed that The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 clearly grants foreign sovereign immunity from suit in United States subject to enumerated exceptions.
After going through arguments of both sides on January 18, 2008 and having observed the law of land, the court held:

1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants immunity to individual officials of a foreign government too for their official-capacity acts, and thus four Saudi princes were entitled to immunity.

2. The district court properly concluded that a Saudi High Commission was an "agency or instrumentality" of the Kingdom and therefore entitled to immunity under the FSIA.

3. None of the exceptions to the FSIA applied and

4. Plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case that the district court had jurisdiction over defendants.

Accordingly, through its judgment dated 14th August, 2008 the court affirmed order of district court of Southern District of New York (Casy J.) and dismissed above appeal.