The US Supreme court observed that District of Columbia’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense and in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.
In 5-4 judgment delivered on June 26, 2008 by US Supreme Court ruled that
1. The Second Amendment to US Constitution protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. It was significant to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved.
(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment to the US Constitution.
(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.
(e) United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes.
2. The Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example - prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings; laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms; etc.
Thus Second Amendment to US Constitution protects an individual's right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001
In this case appeal was sought from orders dated January 10, 2006 entered in district court for the Southern District of New York (Casy J.), which dismissed claims against certain Saudi Arabian defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs/ appellants were persons who incurred losses in September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks: those who suffered personal injuries, the families and representatives of those who died, insurers and property owners. They brought tort claims against number of parties: foreign governments, charitable entities, and individuals alleged to have provided financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda in the runup to the attacks. Appellants preferred appeal in respect of seven of the dismissed defendants: the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, four Saudi Princess, a Saudi Banker, and the Saudi High Commission.
The chief issue in appeal was the scope of foreign sovereign immunity. The court observed that The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 clearly grants foreign sovereign immunity from suit in United States subject to enumerated exceptions.
After going through arguments of both sides on January 18, 2008 and having observed the law of land, the court held:
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants immunity to individual officials of a foreign government too for their official-capacity acts, and thus four Saudi princes were entitled to immunity.
2. The district court properly concluded that a Saudi High Commission was an "agency or instrumentality" of the Kingdom and therefore entitled to immunity under the FSIA.
3. None of the exceptions to the FSIA applied and
4. Plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case that the district court had jurisdiction over defendants.
Accordingly, through its judgment dated 14th August, 2008 the court affirmed order of district court of Southern District of New York (Casy J.) and dismissed above appeal.
The plaintiffs/ appellants were persons who incurred losses in September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks: those who suffered personal injuries, the families and representatives of those who died, insurers and property owners. They brought tort claims against number of parties: foreign governments, charitable entities, and individuals alleged to have provided financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda in the runup to the attacks. Appellants preferred appeal in respect of seven of the dismissed defendants: the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, four Saudi Princess, a Saudi Banker, and the Saudi High Commission.
The chief issue in appeal was the scope of foreign sovereign immunity. The court observed that The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 clearly grants foreign sovereign immunity from suit in United States subject to enumerated exceptions.
After going through arguments of both sides on January 18, 2008 and having observed the law of land, the court held:
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants immunity to individual officials of a foreign government too for their official-capacity acts, and thus four Saudi princes were entitled to immunity.
2. The district court properly concluded that a Saudi High Commission was an "agency or instrumentality" of the Kingdom and therefore entitled to immunity under the FSIA.
3. None of the exceptions to the FSIA applied and
4. Plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case that the district court had jurisdiction over defendants.
Accordingly, through its judgment dated 14th August, 2008 the court affirmed order of district court of Southern District of New York (Casy J.) and dismissed above appeal.
Friday, June 20, 2008
Court sides with employee in benefits case
In 6-to-3 ruling delivered on June 19, 2008 the US Supreme Court held that when ERISA plan administrators that both determine an employee is eligible for benefits and pay benefits out of their own pockets, it creates a conflict of interest and hence a reviewing court should consider such conflict as a factor in determining whether a plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits, and the significance of the factor will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
In the case under consideration, Petitioner Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) is an administrator and the insurer of Sears, Roebuck & Company's long-term disability insurance plan, which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plan gives MetLife (as administrator) discretionary authority to determine the validity of an employee's benefits claim and provides that MetLife (as insurer) will pay the claims. Respondent Wanda Glenn, a Sears employee, was granted an initial 24 months of benefits under the plan following a diagnosis of a heart disorder. MetLife encouraged her to apply for, and she began receiving, Social Security disability benefits based on an agency determination that she could do no work. But when MetLife itself had to determine whether she could work, in order to establish eligibility for extended plan benefits, it found her capable of doing sedentary work and denied her the benefits. Glenn sought federal-court review under ERISA, but the District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit used a deferential standard of review and considered it a conflict of interest that MetLife both determined an employee's eligibility for benefits and paid the benefits out of its own pocket. Based on a combination of this conflict and other circumstances, it set aside MetLife's benefits denial.
The Supreme Court before arriving at conclusion as mentioned above relied on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, which sets out four principles as to the appropriate standard of judicial review:
(1) A court should be "guided by principles of trust law," analogizing a plan administrator to a trustee and considering a benefit determination a fiduciary act, id., at 111-113;
(2) Trust law principles require de novo review unless a benefits plan provides otherwise, id., at 115;
(3) Where the plan so provides, by granting "the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility," a deferential standard of review is appropriate," id., at 111, 115; and
(4) If the administrator or fiduciary having discretion "is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion,' " id., at 115.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Roberts, C. J. filed separate opinion concurring to all but for Part IV and Kennedy, J. filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. According to them a plan administrator's dual role of both evaluating and paying benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of interest referred to in Firestone.
Whereas, Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.
In the case under consideration, Petitioner Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) is an administrator and the insurer of Sears, Roebuck & Company's long-term disability insurance plan, which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plan gives MetLife (as administrator) discretionary authority to determine the validity of an employee's benefits claim and provides that MetLife (as insurer) will pay the claims. Respondent Wanda Glenn, a Sears employee, was granted an initial 24 months of benefits under the plan following a diagnosis of a heart disorder. MetLife encouraged her to apply for, and she began receiving, Social Security disability benefits based on an agency determination that she could do no work. But when MetLife itself had to determine whether she could work, in order to establish eligibility for extended plan benefits, it found her capable of doing sedentary work and denied her the benefits. Glenn sought federal-court review under ERISA, but the District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit used a deferential standard of review and considered it a conflict of interest that MetLife both determined an employee's eligibility for benefits and paid the benefits out of its own pocket. Based on a combination of this conflict and other circumstances, it set aside MetLife's benefits denial.
The Supreme Court before arriving at conclusion as mentioned above relied on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, which sets out four principles as to the appropriate standard of judicial review:
(1) A court should be "guided by principles of trust law," analogizing a plan administrator to a trustee and considering a benefit determination a fiduciary act, id., at 111-113;
(2) Trust law principles require de novo review unless a benefits plan provides otherwise, id., at 115;
(3) Where the plan so provides, by granting "the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility," a deferential standard of review is appropriate," id., at 111, 115; and
(4) If the administrator or fiduciary having discretion "is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion,' " id., at 115.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Roberts, C. J. filed separate opinion concurring to all but for Part IV and Kennedy, J. filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. According to them a plan administrator's dual role of both evaluating and paying benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of interest referred to in Firestone.
Whereas, Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.
Monday, June 9, 2008
Retaliation against Federal Employee
CBOCS WEST, INC., PETITIONER v. HEDRICK G. HUMPHRIES
In 7-2 judgment delivered on May 27, 2008 by US Supreme Court ruled that Employees who complain of racial bias in the workplace and then face retaliation can sue under the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Act of 1866 and amended by Congress in 1991, which was originally enacted as part of the oldest civil rights laws to ensure former slaves and other blacks had the same right to make contracts as whites.
In this case Hendrick Humphries, who had been an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant from 1999 to 2001 in Bradley, Illinois claimed that he had been retaliated against because he complained to the district manager that the store manager had discriminated against him and another black employee.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ. joined relied on Rev. Stat. §1977, 42 U. S. C. §1981(a) wherein it was held that a longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that "a persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens". They further observed that basic question before them was whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person's contract-related "right." They finally concludeed that it does.
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
In another similar case, a 45-year-old postal worker Myrna Gomez-Perez, a U.S. Postal Service clerk in Puerto Rico filed suit claiming that her employer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), when she was subjected to various forms of retaliation after she filed an age discrimination complaint after being denied a transfer to a job she had previously held.
In the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito said the court followed the reasoning of two prior rulings and finally held that retaliation is covered by similar language in other anti-discrimination laws also.
Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, dissented only to the extent that Congress in adopting the age bias law did not implicitly intend to create a judicial remedy for retaliation against federal employees when it expressly did so for private-sector workers.
In 7-2 judgment delivered on May 27, 2008 by US Supreme Court ruled that Employees who complain of racial bias in the workplace and then face retaliation can sue under the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Act of 1866 and amended by Congress in 1991, which was originally enacted as part of the oldest civil rights laws to ensure former slaves and other blacks had the same right to make contracts as whites.
In this case Hendrick Humphries, who had been an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant from 1999 to 2001 in Bradley, Illinois claimed that he had been retaliated against because he complained to the district manager that the store manager had discriminated against him and another black employee.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ. joined relied on Rev. Stat. §1977, 42 U. S. C. §1981(a) wherein it was held that a longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that "a persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens". They further observed that basic question before them was whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person's contract-related "right." They finally concludeed that it does.
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
In another similar case, a 45-year-old postal worker Myrna Gomez-Perez, a U.S. Postal Service clerk in Puerto Rico filed suit claiming that her employer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), when she was subjected to various forms of retaliation after she filed an age discrimination complaint after being denied a transfer to a job she had previously held.
In the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito said the court followed the reasoning of two prior rulings and finally held that retaliation is covered by similar language in other anti-discrimination laws also.
Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, dissented only to the extent that Congress in adopting the age bias law did not implicitly intend to create a judicial remedy for retaliation against federal employees when it expressly did so for private-sector workers.
Friday, May 16, 2008
City & County of San Francisco Vs State of California - In re Marriage Cases
The California Supreme Court in a historic 4-3 decision dated May 15, 2008 authored by Chief Justice Ronald George, joined by Associate Justices Joyce Kennard, Kathryn Werdegar and Carlos Moreno ruled that the state's failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples as marriage violates the California Constitution being it raises constitutional concerns not only under the state constitutional right to marry, but also under the state constitutional equal protection clause, and further strike down two state laws that had limited marriages to unions between a man and a woman, thereby allowing same sex marriage.
The state’s ban on same-sex marriage was based on a law enacted by the legislature in 1977 and a statewide initiative approved by the voters in 2000, both defining marriage as limited to unions between a man and a woman. The question of law before the Supreme Court of California was whether those laws violated provisions of the state Constitution protecting equality and fundamental rights.
Writing for majority, Chief Justice Ronald M. George opined: “In view of the substance and significance of the fundamental constitutional right to form a family relationship, the California Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all Californians, whether gay or heterosexual, and to same-sex couples as well as to opposite-sex couples.”
He further observed: “The right to marry represents the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with a person of one’s choice and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society and to the individual.”
Chief Justice George conceded: “as an historical matter in this state, marriage has always been restricted to a union between a man and a woman. But tradition alone does not justify the denial of a fundamental constitutional right.”
He further clarified that this decision in discussion does not affect the constitutional validity of the existing prohibitions against polygamy and the marriage of close relatives.
Besides above the court also considered the ground of equal protection and held that when courts weigh whether distinctions among people or groups violate the right to equal protection, they require only a rational basis for the distinction, a relatively easy standard to meet. But when the discrimination is based on race, sex or religion, the courts must require a more substantial and rigorous justification.
In dissenting opinion, Justice Carol A. Corrigan wrote that her personal sympathies were with the plaintiffs challenging the bans on same-sex marriage. But she observed: “We should allow the significant achievements embodied in the domestic partnership statutes to continue to take root, If there is to be a new understanding of the meaning of marriage in California, it should develop among the people of our state and find its expression at the ballot box.”
Justice Marvin Baxter, joined by Justice Ming Chin also dissented with remarks: "If such a profound change in this ancient social institution is to occur, the people and their representatives, who represent the public conscience, should have the right, and the responsibility, to control the pace of that change through the democratic process."
The state’s ban on same-sex marriage was based on a law enacted by the legislature in 1977 and a statewide initiative approved by the voters in 2000, both defining marriage as limited to unions between a man and a woman. The question of law before the Supreme Court of California was whether those laws violated provisions of the state Constitution protecting equality and fundamental rights.
Writing for majority, Chief Justice Ronald M. George opined: “In view of the substance and significance of the fundamental constitutional right to form a family relationship, the California Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all Californians, whether gay or heterosexual, and to same-sex couples as well as to opposite-sex couples.”
He further observed: “The right to marry represents the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with a person of one’s choice and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society and to the individual.”
Chief Justice George conceded: “as an historical matter in this state, marriage has always been restricted to a union between a man and a woman. But tradition alone does not justify the denial of a fundamental constitutional right.”
He further clarified that this decision in discussion does not affect the constitutional validity of the existing prohibitions against polygamy and the marriage of close relatives.
Besides above the court also considered the ground of equal protection and held that when courts weigh whether distinctions among people or groups violate the right to equal protection, they require only a rational basis for the distinction, a relatively easy standard to meet. But when the discrimination is based on race, sex or religion, the courts must require a more substantial and rigorous justification.
In dissenting opinion, Justice Carol A. Corrigan wrote that her personal sympathies were with the plaintiffs challenging the bans on same-sex marriage. But she observed: “We should allow the significant achievements embodied in the domestic partnership statutes to continue to take root, If there is to be a new understanding of the meaning of marriage in California, it should develop among the people of our state and find its expression at the ballot box.”
Justice Marvin Baxter, joined by Justice Ming Chin also dissented with remarks: "If such a profound change in this ancient social institution is to occur, the people and their representatives, who represent the public conscience, should have the right, and the responsibility, to control the pace of that change through the democratic process."
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
In 6-to-3 ruling delivered on April 28, 2008 the US Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s voter-identification law declaring requirement to produce government-issued photo identification is not unconstitutional and that the state has a “valid interest” in improving election procedures as well as deterring fraud. The court rejected arguments that Indiana’s law imposes unjustified burdens on people who are old, poor or members of minority groups and they are less likely to have any government issued photo identification.
Justice John Paul Stevens, announced the judgment of the court and wrote an opinion in which Chief John G. Roberts Jr. and Anthony M. Kennedy joined. They observed that the plaintiffs who attacked the law, seeking a declaration that it was unconstitutional on its face, had failed to meet the heavy burden required for such a “facial challenge” to prevail. Arguments that the law in question may benefit Republicans and may work against Democrats, whose ranks are more likely to include poor people or those in minority groups, were also brushed aside.
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. concurred in the judgment of the court and remarked that “The law should be upheld because its overall burden is minimal and justified.” Reason behind such remark could be that said law in question allows voters who lack government issued photo identification to cast a provisional ballot, and then appear at their county courthouse within 10 days to show required identification.
Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented. Justice Souter said the Indiana law in question, which calls for a government-issued photo identification, like a driver’s license or passport, “threatens to impose nontrivial burdens on the voting rights of tens of thousands of the state’s citizens.”
This judgement in discussion have much significance in US Election Law because approx. 20 states have similar law and with this judgement they all have now hope for survival.
Justice John Paul Stevens, announced the judgment of the court and wrote an opinion in which Chief John G. Roberts Jr. and Anthony M. Kennedy joined. They observed that the plaintiffs who attacked the law, seeking a declaration that it was unconstitutional on its face, had failed to meet the heavy burden required for such a “facial challenge” to prevail. Arguments that the law in question may benefit Republicans and may work against Democrats, whose ranks are more likely to include poor people or those in minority groups, were also brushed aside.
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. concurred in the judgment of the court and remarked that “The law should be upheld because its overall burden is minimal and justified.” Reason behind such remark could be that said law in question allows voters who lack government issued photo identification to cast a provisional ballot, and then appear at their county courthouse within 10 days to show required identification.
Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented. Justice Souter said the Indiana law in question, which calls for a government-issued photo identification, like a driver’s license or passport, “threatens to impose nontrivial burdens on the voting rights of tens of thousands of the state’s citizens.”
This judgement in discussion have much significance in US Election Law because approx. 20 states have similar law and with this judgement they all have now hope for survival.
Saturday, April 26, 2008
VIRGINIA v. MOORE
In the above noted case Police found the respondent Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license and instead of issuing court summons as per Virginia Law arrested him as they discovered crack cocaine while searching respondent Moore and carrying out his arrest. In the trial court on behalf of the respondent Moore, it was argued that his arrest violated Virginia Law even if he could be arrested but on grounds of Fourth Amendment to the constitution arresting officers couldn’t search him and hence evidence must be suppressed. But, the trial court declined to suppress the evidence and convicted Moore.
This decision was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court holding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search without citation.
Ultimately, the case came before US Supreme Court, which decided the issue 9-0 on April 23, 2008. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Whereas Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment separately.
Held: The police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or when they performed a search incident to the arrest.
(a) Because the founding era's statutes and common law do not support Moore's view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate statutes, this is "not a case in which the claimant can point to a 'clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since,' " Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 345.
(b) Where history provides no conclusive answer, the Court can analyze a search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300. Applying that methodology, US Supreme Court has held that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
(c) The Court adheres to this approach because an arrest based on probable cause serves interests that justify seizure. Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation. A State's choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules. Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and variable from place to place and time to time.
(d) The Court rejected Moore's argument that even if the Constitution allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him. Officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218. It was observed that officers issuing citations may not face the same danger, and thus do not have the same authority to search, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113. But here the officers arrested Moore, and therefore faced the risks which were an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed the use of evidence seized by police officers in the search of a criminal suspect during an arrest that violated state law and reversed the decision of Virginia Supreme Court and remanded back.
This decision was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court holding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search without citation.
Ultimately, the case came before US Supreme Court, which decided the issue 9-0 on April 23, 2008. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Whereas Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment separately.
Held: The police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or when they performed a search incident to the arrest.
(a) Because the founding era's statutes and common law do not support Moore's view that the Fourth Amendment was intended to incorporate statutes, this is "not a case in which the claimant can point to a 'clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since,' " Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 345.
(b) Where history provides no conclusive answer, the Court can analyze a search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300. Applying that methodology, US Supreme Court has held that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable.
(c) The Court adheres to this approach because an arrest based on probable cause serves interests that justify seizure. Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation. A State's choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules. Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and variable from place to place and time to time.
(d) The Court rejected Moore's argument that even if the Constitution allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him. Officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218. It was observed that officers issuing citations may not face the same danger, and thus do not have the same authority to search, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113. But here the officers arrested Moore, and therefore faced the risks which were an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed the use of evidence seized by police officers in the search of a criminal suspect during an arrest that violated state law and reversed the decision of Virginia Supreme Court and remanded back.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)